
How might ASF spread in the US?


Ben Blair, DVM







Let's compare a few unique outbreaks in Europe over the last 3 years


Outbreaks in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Belgium Wild Boar exclusive outbreaks













Ukraine and Romania

Domestic pig dominated

Poland's outbreak

Wild boar dominated









Spread of African Swine Fever is radial around an epicenter in wild boar populations.


What do these maps tell us?





Spread of African Swine Fever is asymmetric and progressive within domestic swine populations


What do these maps tell us?





Spread of Aftrican Swine Fever is assymetric and progressive within domestic swine populations

What do these maps tell us?







So if not wild boars, who is to blame for the spread of ASF in domestic pigs.

• Unfortunately like most other diseases that face the swine industry today we tend to be the drivers of disease spread.

- PEDV
- PRRSV
- TGE



Routes of Pathogen Introdcution

Animals

- Pigs
- Other

Things Entering

- Transport
- Supplies
- Equipment

Things Leaving

- Dead
 Removal
- Manure
 Removal

People

- Workers
- Visitors



I'm going to focus on 2 big topics today...

Infected animal movements

Contaminated trailer movements





Routes of Pathogen Introdcution

Animals

- Pigs
- Other

Things Entering

- Transport
- Supplies
- Equipment

Things Leaving


- Dead
 Removal
- Manure Removal

People

- Workers
- Visitors



The movement and introduction of diseased animals into naive herds



- Still one of the most common routes we observe during disease outbreaks on farms
- Movement of diseased animals also increases the possibility of indirect transmission by contaminating trailers, etc.



Ways to prevent the spread of ASF via live animal introductions

- Ability to indentify ASF within animals
- Understand the trust the source of your aniamls.
- Limit the number of introductions if possible and feasible




One positive trailer in means 1.7 positive trailers at exit

Plant	Contaminated at entry	Contaminated at Plant	Contamination Ratio
Α	2.25%	8.05%	3.58
В	7.00%	4.30%	0.61
С	10.84%	10.81%	1.00
D	2.00%	0.00%	0.00
E	14.56%	3.08%	0.62
G	3.00%	1.03%	0.34
All	5.98%	4.31%	0.72



Conditions at the time of unloading influence contamination rates




More contact increases risk

More virus increases risk



The number of connections generated is mind-boggling...






So if we know trailers can spread disease, and there are a lot of opportunities for disease to contact farms, what do we know about the risky points of contact, i.e. markets.

Here's what we know about the Cull Sow Market

- Sows travel on average over 300mi with some traveling as far as 1200mi
- Plants receive sows from 17 states on average





They also stay in the marketing channel awhile.

Days	Percent	
<=3days	66.1%	
4-5days	24.3%	
>5days	9.6%	

- Does anyone know the incubation period of ASF?
- Somewhere between 4-19days



What does all this mean...

 Introduction of ASF within these marketing channels may allow disease to replicate and spread back to farms

Again stresses the idea around proper disease identification

• Emphasizes the need for sound biosecurity practices.




Movement of animals, people, or objects most likely way ASF will spread Proper and expediate disease identification is key to limiting the spread of ASF

Biosecurity practices, are still the best measures to prevent the introduction and limit the spread of ASF




ASF history within Spain









Biosecurity Works!!!

